both) in Boston. Orders for insurance also came from other nearby ports including Salem, Gloucester, Newport, Newburyport and Plymouth. A large fraction of insured voyages were to the West Indies, with smaller numbers to Britain, Europe and Africa, as well as several policies on privateers and their prizes and a handful of whaling and fishing voyages.
Although the number of voyages to Africa, most of which involved the transportation of enslaved people, was relatively small, the brutal institution of slavery was integral to the entire Atlantic economy. Much of Boston’ s trade involved the shipping of provisions to the West Indies, and the transportation of slave-produced goods to markets in Europe and America. Policies insured on vessels traveling from Africa— usually to the West Indies— habitually added a clause to the policy specifying that the underwriters would not be liable for“ Insurrections, deaths and maimings of the slaves and all loss occasioned thereby.” Price’ s records also contain a handful of policies insuring individual enslaved people, such as £ 40 insured on a woman being transported from Boston to Virginia in 1760( the insurance did not cover the danger of her death; rather, it was intended to protect against seizure of property by the enemy).
Premiums could vary widely even on apparently similar voyages, particularly in wartime. Price’ s order book gives us a glimpse of some snippets of the kind of information that may have influenced underwriters’ judgments in particular instances, such as“ sailed the 24 Jan no advice since,”“ she is a new ship,”“ is to stop at Nantucket to inquire if the coast is clear,”“ orders were to go to Cape Francois, but if chased or should fall in with any other island then to Trade and make his Voyage,”“ Last advice from the Cape was not arrived there, out then 26 or 27 days well fitted” and mentions of armament, such as“ two 6 pounders five 4 pounders 6 swivels 20 small arms lances cutlasses pistols & c 15 men all stout.”
During the French and Indian War, premiums frequently exceeded 10 %. Afterward, they returned to peacetime rates— typically 3 % on one-way voyages to London, 3 – 4 % to ports in Europe and 3 – 6 % to the West Indies, depending on the details of the route and policy conditions. Despite the tranquility of the marine insurance market, however, these were
Ezekiel Price insurance advertisement in the Boston News-Letter, March 22, 1759.
politically tempestuous times. A series of British parliamentary acts imposed new taxes and trade restrictions, alongside reforms intended to reduce smuggling and evasion of duties.
Colonial merchants responded by organizing“ non-importation” agreements, which won some temporary concessions but proved difficult to maintain. Further duties contributed to the escalating tensions that ultimately led to the Boston Massacre in 1770, the Boston Tea Party in 1773 and eventually the battles at Lexington and Concord in April 1775. Boston’ s merchant community, of course, played a central role in many of these events, and throughout, Price’ s brokerage remained open for business.
By late 1773, the danger of war with Britain was becoming evident. On November 3, Joseph Dean insured the ship Dublin from Boston to Surinam and back at 6 %, with“ No loss in case of capture by a War.” But he evidently thought better of it; the policy was voided and a new one issued only five days later, still at a rate of 6 %, but agreeing to pay an additional 4 % if war against England were declared before the vessel returned. From late 1773, an increasing number of policies contained clauses such as“ All Loss occasioned by a War is excepted herein,” whether because underwriters declined to insure the danger of enemy capture or because merchants were unwilling to pay the higher premiums that would entail. Such clauses became virtually universal by early 1774.
Price’ s business ceased during the Siege of Boston, when Price, along with many others, left the city. After the British evacuation, business resumed, but throughout the remainder of the Revolutionary War, the offshore presence of British naval vessels and privateers, as well as loyalist privateers operating out of New York and other ports, created enormous dangers for Boston’ s merchant shipping. Premium rates of 35 – 50 % on single voyages from Boston to the West Indies were common, and 60-70 %, even occasionally 80 %, was paid on round-trip voyages in 1777 – 1779, before rates fell slightly during 1780 – 1781. Only an immensely profitable trade could have borne such astronomical premiums; but in such perilous seas, few were willing to undertake any venture without insurance.
Political independence from Britain opened new opportunities for trade with continental Europe and the non-British West Indian islands, and the resumption of trade with Britain and her colonies. Insurance rates fell to peacetime levels, and American merchants reverted to purchasing some of their insurance in London, particularly on transatlantic risks, but they were now also purchasing much of their insurance from American insurance brokerages, several of which were by then well-established in each of the major ports.
With the advent of the European war in 1793, the prospects for American trade brightened considerably. Britain’ s naval superiority effectively cut off direct communications between France and its colonies, so at the outbreak of the war the French opened their colonial ports to American vessels, hoping to preserve their trade by employing the Americans as neutral carriers. As a result, American trade volumes and shipping tonnage grew rapidly. Yet although the United States remained officially neutral in the 1790s, neutral rights were constantly contested as the belligerents each attempted to curtail trade with their adversary. At different times, both Britain and France seized hundreds of ostensibly“ neutral” American vessels on various pretexts.
The explosion of trade volumes, together with the increased risks to American
26 FINANCIAL HISTORY | Spring / Summer 2026 | www. MoAF. org