Financial History Issue 130 (Summer 2019) | Page 15

rather struggled to improve their access to business loans, mortgages, insurance and investment vehicles like mutual savings banks. They did it the traditional Ameri- can way, called self-help. In other words, when they found themselves unreason- ably excluded from incumbent financial institutions, they formed their own and got down to business. In fact, the history of financial innova- tion in the United States can be told as the story of groups excluded from incumbent institutions creating their own markets and intermediaries. When British authori- ties told Philadelphia merchants Thomas Willing and Robert Morris that they could not form a commercial bank to alleviate the severe shortage of money and credit afflicting the colonial economy in the 1760s, they both joined a revolutionary movement that overthrew those authori- ties and established the Bank of North America, the new nation’s first incorpo- rated joint-stock commercial bank. When artisans, farmers, mechanics and retailers found that that bank, and its emulators, lent more freely to merchants than to them, they chartered their own commer- cial banks. So, too, did Irish, German and other immigrants when they believed they were not getting a fair shake. Early commercial banks lent to busi- nesses and did not seek, or even want, deposits from individuals. Their business model excluded the poor, who joined forces with philanthropists to create mutual savings banks, an early type of mutual fund. For-profit savings banks also cropped up, as did building and loan asso- ciations, which, along with wealthy indi- viduals and life insurers, supplied the bulk of mortgages to middle class homeowners and small proprietors for over a century. The working poor and middling types also developed their own life and health insurance via non-profit fraternal asso- ciations. Their organizations proved so successful at minimizing adverse selection and moral hazard that by the late 19th century big life insurers began to cater to Irish depositors of the Emigrant Savings Bank in New York City withdrawing money to send to their suffering relatives in the old country, March 13, 1880. the poor as well, with small denomination industrial life insurance policies. After World War II, inexpensive group term life policies offered by employers as fringe benefits supplanted industrial insurance. While savings banks accepted deposits from the poor, they would not lend to them, leaving low-income individuals exposed to the predatory practices of pawn brokers and other chattel lenders, note shavers/loan sharks and salary buyers/payday lenders. Credit unions, industrial banks, loan societ- ies and lombards arose to lend small sums for short terms to low income borrowers on easier terms. Despite the nominally high interest rates they charged, however, lenders generally did not find the market a lucrative one, so sharks still lurked, especially where usury laws limited lawful competition, as they long did in economically backwards places like Arkansas. Financial regulations, like interest rate caps, often did more to hurt downtrod- den groups than to help them. Bankers, brokers and insurers found loopholes in almost every law that tried to coerce them into behaving in ways that they believed were not in their best interest. Rather than fruitlessly try to force financiers to lend to members of groups that believed they were being discriminated against, regula- tors long encouraged self-help instead. Instead of telling incumbent life insurers to insure the lives of German immigrants, for example, New York policymakers allowed Germans to form their own insur- ers, like the Germania, which today is a Fortune 500 Company called Guardian Life Insurance Company of America. Sim- ilarly, Irish immigrants formed mutual savings banks, like the Emigrant Sav- ings Bank, which served Irish immigrants for generations before demutualizing in 1986. At the other end of the financial spectrum, Jewish immigrants excluded from WASP-y social and business circles formed investment banks like Lehman Brothers and Goldman Sachs. After the Civil War, African Americans who did not want to pay the high premiums demanded by incumbents on the basis of biased actuarial tables formed their own life insurers. The most efficient of them earned fortunes and in the process helped thou- sands of Black families to insure against the death of their breadwinners. Insurers like North Carolina Mutual proved so success- ful that white-controlled insurers realized that Black lives really do matter and began to buy Black-owned insurers, like Standard Life Insurance Company of Atlanta, or to court African Americans directly with more reasonable rates. By the 1960s, hold- ing income constant, African Americans were more likely to have life insurance coverage than Whites. www.MoAF.org  |  Summer 2019  |  FINANCIAL HISTORY  13